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Assuming Responsibility for Incarcerated Children: A Rights Case 
for Care-based Homes 
 
Kathryn Hollingsworth
*
 
 
Abstract:  
There is overwhelming empirical evidence that the rights and wellbeing of children 
incarcerated in penal institutions in England and Wales are inadequately protected, 
despite some significant rights-based litigation taken by detained children and their 
advocates. The removal of criminal legal aid from all prisoners, including children, 
and the potential future repeal of the Human Rights Act will further increase their 
vulnerability to rights-abuses. This article argues that that one solution to this current 
legal problem is to abolish penal institutions for children sentenced to custody and to 
place them instead in care-based homes.  A rights-based case is made for this solution 
by conceptualising the rights of incarcerated children to argue that the State has an 
assumed responsibility to parent children deprived of their liberty; a responsibility 
that can be met only in small, care-based homes. The article concludes by setting out 
the Coalition Government’s recent proposals to introduce Secure Colleges in the 
juvenile secure estate, and briefly considers whether these new institutions will 
facilitate the State’s fulfilment of its assumed responsibility to parent incarcerated 
children. 
 
The problem of children deprived of their liberty in England and Wales is less current, 
less pressing, than it was ten or even five years ago - at least if we measure the extent 
of that problem by the number of children sentenced or remanded to custody.  Over 
the course of the last six years the rate of incarceration for the under 18s has dropped 
from 3029 in 2008 (a figure that had been relatively stable for much of that decade
1
), 
to 1177 in March 2014;
2
 a significant decrease that is hard to dismiss as either an 
aberration or a temporary dip.
3
  However, it is not possible to conclude from this trend 
                                                        
*
 Professor of Law, Newcastle Law School. My thanks to Claire Sands for research assistance and to 
Richard Collier, Nikki Godden and Kevin J Brown for comments on ideas from an earlier version of 
this paper, and to those who attended my CLP lecture.  All errors remain my own. 
1
 Prison Reform Trust/Inquest, Fatally Flawed: Has the State Learned Lessons from the Deaths of 
Children and Young People in Prison (London 2012) 17.    
2
 Ministry of Justice, Youth Custody Report March 2014 (May 2014), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/youth-custody-data <accessed 27 May 2014>. 
3
 The reasons for the decrease have been attributed to the reduction in the numbers of children entering 
the youth justice system (primarily as a result of the removal of the police ‘offences to justice’ target 
which reduced the managerial pressures on the police to take action for minor or first time offences; 
and a more flexible system of diversion introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012) and a greater willingness by sentencing judges to use the more flexible 
community sentence, the Youth Rehabilitation Order.  See Ministry of Justice/YJB, Youth Justice 
Statistics 2011-12 (Jan 2013) ch 7 and R Allen, Last Resort? Exploring the Reduction in Child 
Imprisonment 2008–11 (London 2011).   
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that the youth custodial system is now one that is consistent with children’s rights.4  
This is not only because the child custody figures remain troubling when viewed from 
a wider comparative, historical and legal context
5
 (thus indicating that custody is still 
not used only as a measure of last resort as required by international children’s rights 
standards
6
); and nor is it because only certain groups have benefitted from the 
decrease whilst others have not.
7
  It is because these statistics do not provide any 
indication as to how, and how well, minors are treated within penal institutions when 
they are remanded or sentenced to custody.  It is this current legal problem - the 
rights-consistency of child custodial institutions - that is the focus of this article.   
Specifically, I wish to make a rights-based case for abolishing prison-type 
accommodation for under 18s and to argue instead that all detained children should be 
placed in care-based homes.  Currently, the majority of children in the secure estate 
are placed in Young Offender Institution (YOIs) or Secure Training Centres (STCs), 
and only girls and the youngest and most vulnerable children are accommodated in 
secure children’s homes (SCHs).8  My argument is primarily conceptual but it is 
supported by the empirical evidence (set out in section one) that YOIs (and to a lesser 
extent STCs) have failed to protect children’s domestic and internationally enshrined 
rights.  In section two, I briefly consider the reported cases where the common law 
and human rights have been used to challenge custody placement decisions, and I 
suggest that although children’s rights are now litigated and better protected – in line 
with the developments in prison law more generally – and can provide (albeit limited) 
                                                        
4
 Though it is more rights consistent, and policies and guidance indicate a greater level of rights-
awareness.  See eg Sentencing Guidelines Council, Overarching Principles: Sentencing Youths (2009) 
paras 1.3 and 11.5 and the explicit reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in the 
CPS guidance on prosecuting young offenders, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/youth_offenders/ <accessed 27 May 2014>.  
5
 England and Wales has one of the highest rates of child imprisonment in Western Europe: see House 
of Commons Justice Committee, Youth Justice: Seventh Report 2012-13 (HC 339, 2013) para 54.  The 
high point from which the current rate has dropped (2009) was itself 795% higher than the rate in 1989: 
Howard League for Penal Reform, ‘Submission to the UN Committee Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: 5th Periodic Review of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (London 2013). Children are sentenced to custody for breaching 
community orders, for minor offences, and for failing to comply with civil orders where the behaviour 
itself is not a criminal offence.  
6
 Article 37(b) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. On whether the statutory custody 
thresholds are complied with, see J Glover and P Hibbert, Locking Up or Giving Up (London 2009) 5, 
which found in the sample of cases examined 35% did not reach the Detention and Training Order 
statutory requirement for seriousness and persistency. 
7
 The custody rate for children whose ethnic identity is black is still two-thirds the rate of 2005 
(dropping from 373 to 266 in 2013) whilst for white children it is just over a third (dropping from 2189 
in 2005 to 747 in 2013).   
8
 The differences between these three types of institution is discussed below.  
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individual redress, they have so far proved unsuccessful in securing the type of 
systemic or structural change necessary for the juvenile secure estate to be more 
rights-consistent overall.  Specifically, rights-based litigation has not led to the 
abolition of the type of institution that is most harmful to children: the YOI.  Thus, 
prison-type accommodation continues to dominate the landscape of the juvenile 
secure estate.  In section three I explain why this is a particularly current problem, 
pointing to changes in the legal environment – including legal aid reform and the 
potential repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 – which will make it more difficult for 
children detained in YOIs to seek legal advice and remedies in relation to their 
treatment therein.  In section four I conceptualise the rights of incarcerated children 
and from here I argue that detained minors have a right to be placed in a care based 
home.  This right derives from the State’s assumed responsibility to parent children 
deprived of their liberty; a responsibility that cannot be met within YOIs but which 
instead requires the use of small, care-based homes.  My argument therefore provides 
the necessary conceptual basis to support the claims of other scholars and children’s 
rights advocates that children should be removed from prison-type penal 
accommodation.  I conclude the article by setting out the Coalition Government’s 
recent proposals to replace YOIs and STCs with Secure Colleges, and briefly consider 
whether these new institutions will facilitate the State’s fulfilment of its assumed 
responsibility to incarcerated children. 
 
The Nature of the Current Legal Problem: The Experiences of Children in the 
Juvenile Secure Estate 
 
It is not the purpose of this article to conduct a rights-audit of the juvenile secure 
estate in England and Wales.
9
  Nonetheless, it is helpful to set out some of the 
qualitative and quantitative data on children’s experiences of carceral institutions in 
order to provide the empirical context for the legal and conceptual arguments that 
follow.  The evidence demonstrates that against most indicators – the United Nations 
                                                        
9
 On the utility of children’s rights as an audit tool, see U Kilkelly and L Lundy, ‘Children’s Rights in 
Action: Using the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as an Auditing Tool’ (2006) 18 Child and 
Family LQ 33.  See also B Goldson and U Kilkelly, ‘International Human Rights Standards and Child 
Imprisonment: Potentialities and Limitations’ (2013) 21 Int J of Children’s Rights 345. 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and its related documents
10
, the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
11
, or wider notions of children’s 
welfare or wellbeing
12
 – the juvenile secure estate in England and Wales does not fare 
well.
13
  
First, children die in detention,
14
 mostly as a result of suicide or self-harm - 
rates of which are generally high across the secure estate
15
 - and on occasion death 
occurs after the use of restraint or at the hands of another child.
16
  33 Thirty-three 
children died in the secure estate between 1990 and 2012 including three between 
2011-12.
17
  The inquests and investigations into these deaths reveal that the children 
who died were ‘often very vulnerable and none received the level of support and 
protection they needed’.18   
Secondly, children in the secure estate are subject to physical and 
psychological harm or intrusion from those who are charged with their care.  This is 
most clearly the case when children are subject to restraint, which sometimes involves 
                                                        
10
 In particular see Articles 3, 6, and 12 and the criminal justice specific provisions in Articles 37 and 
40 UNCRC; UN Standard Minimum Rules for Juvenile Justice (‘The Beijing Rules’), (A/RES/40/33, 
1985); UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (A/RES/45/113, 1990); and 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 10: Children’s Rights in Juvenile 
Justice (CRC/C/GC/10, 25 Apr 2007).  Taken together, these standards set out the overarching 
principle that children deprived of their liberty should be treated in accordance with their inherent 
dignity and humanity. 
11
 In particular, Articles 2, 3, and 8.  The domestic courts draw on the UNCRC to interpret the ECHR 
for children, and thus sometimes the threshold for engagement is lower, and what is proportionate 
differs.  See ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 
WLR 148, and in the context of juvenile custody see (inter alia) R (on the application of C) v the 
Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 882, [2009] QB 657; R (on the Application of BP) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 1963; R (on the application of SR) v 
Nottingham Magistrates’ Court [2001] EWHC Admin 802. 
12
 What is meant by wellbeing or welfare is fairly nebulous and context dependent. Every Child 
Matters set out five outcomes: be healthy; stay safe; enjoy and achieve; make a positive contribution; 
active economic wellbeing.  These criteria are reflected in the definition of wellbeing in the Children 
Act 2004, s 10(2). 
13
 For an overview of the rights of children in England and Wales when deprived of their liberty see R 
(on the Application of SR) v Nottingham Magistrates’ Court (n 11) [66] per Brooke LJ.  On occasion 
children are detained in the adult not juvenile secure estate (contrary to Article 37(c) UNCRC): see 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, Jeremy Wright (HC, 10 January 2013, c. 
443W) (five children were placed in adult prisons in 2011). 
14
 See Prison Reform Trust/Inquest, above n 1; YJB (2014) Deaths of Children in Custody: Action 
Taken, Lessons Learnt; and Inquest, Child Deaths in Penal Custody 1990-date (undated) 
http://www.inquest.org.uk/pdf/Deaths_of_Children_in_Penal_Custody_1990-date.pdf <accessed 27 
May 2014>. 
15
 There were 1,791 incidents of self-harm in 2011-12; down 35% from 2008 but up 21% from the year 
before.  The rate for girls is especially high (at 26%).  See Youth Justice Board/Ministry of Justice, 
Youth Justice Statistics 2012-13 (London 2014). 
16
 Gareth Myatt and Chris Greenaway respectively: Inquest (n 14).    
17
 Inquest (n 14).  
18
 As reported by Prison Reform Trust/Inquest (n 1) 1. 
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the use of pain-infliction techniques,
19
 sometimes the use of handcuffs,
20
 and 
sometimes results in injury.
21
  In 2011-12, there were 8,419 incidents of restraint 
involving children in prison, an average of 702 incidents involving 474 children per 
month;
22
 more than in 2008-09 when the custody rate was much higher.  
Proportionately, children from black and minority ethnic groups are more likely to be 
restrained, as are young children and girls.  In addition to the use of restraint, until 
May 2014 incarcerated children were subject to routine strip-searching.
23
  This meant, 
as Andrew Neilsen noted, that on their first day in custody vulnerable children, some 
of whom will have been victims of sexual abuse, were required to undress in front of 
two adults.
24
  
Thirdly and more generally, children experience penal institutions as violent 
and harsh.  This is partly due to the physical environment, particularly when children 
are placed in segregation units where they may not receive education or purposeful 
activity and sometimes have little time outside of their cell.
25
  Despite the drop in the 
custody rate, some institutions now rely to an even greater extent on segregation.
26
 
Violence can also come from other young people, and in some institutions children 
experience a great deal of assault and bullying.
27
  The distance of many incarcerated 
                                                        
19
 Ministry of Justice, Use of Restraint Policy Framework for the Under 18s Secure Estate (London 
2012) para 17 ff. Pain-inducing techniques were used on children in STCs six times in 2009-10 and 
five times in 2010-11 (see Children’s Rights Alliance for England, The State of Children’s Rights 2012 
(London 2012) 37).  Data is not collected for the use of restraint in YOIs and SCHs (but the Prison 
Reform Trust/Inquest (n 1) notes that SCHs do not use pain induction techniques and nor, anymore, 
does Hassockfield STC.  On the (il)legality of previous STC rules relating to the use of pain-inflicting 
restraint for the purposes of good order and discipline, see R (C) v SSJ (n 11). 
20
 Prison Reform Trust/Inquest (n 1) report that between 2006-10 children in Hassockfield STC were 
restrained using handcuffs on 57 occasions.  See also Ministry of Justice, ibid. 
21
 Prison Reform Trust/Inquest (n 1) 25. 
22
 Ministry of Justice/YJB (n 3).  
23
 43,960 incidents of strip-searching took place in the 21 months up to December 2012. See E Allison, 
‘43,000 strip-searches carried out on children as young as 12’ The Guardian, 3 March 2013.  Strip-
searches will now be risk based: see Lord Faulks, HL Deb, 6 May 2014, c338W and the revised PSI 
16/2014, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/psis <accessed 27 May 2014>. 
24
 A Neilson, ‘Trial to curb strip searching in youth custody’, Children and Young People Now, 13 June 
2013, available at http://www.cypnow.co.uk/cyp/news/1077571/trial-curb-strip-searching-youth-
custody <accessed 27 May 2014>.  
25
 On legal challenges to segregation see R (on the Application of BP) v SSHD (n 11) and MA v 
Independent Adjudicator [2013] EWHC 438 (Admin); and on the related issue of loss of association 
see KB v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 15 (Admin).  On how children experience 
segregation, see Howard League for Penal Reform, Life Inside 2010: A Unique Insight into the Day to 
Day Experiences of 15-17 year old Males in Prison (London 2010) 20, available at: 
http://www.howardleague.org/publications-youngpeople/ <accessed 27 May 2014>.  
26
 In Ashfield YOI, there were188 incidents of segregation in 2008 compared to 377 in 2011: Crispin 
Blunt, HC Deb, 12 March 2012, c100W. 
27
 A key concern expressed by children involved in the Howard League for Penal Reform’s UR Boss 
campaign. See also T Bateman, ‘Children Imprisoned in England and Wales Less Likely to Feel Safe 
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children from their family and friends exacerbates these problems because visits, 
continuing relationships, and the support that comes with them are made more 
difficult.
28
  
Finally, the State’s obligations fall short of those owed to comparable groups 
of children not in the secure estate.  For example, minimum standards for educational 
activity are much lower.  Only 15 hours per week are required in some types of 
accommodation,
29
 and in practice some children receive only 11.
30
  Resettlement 
provision for juveniles leaving the secure estate is also not comparable to the support 
provided to children leaving other types of state care.
31
  Both of these factors (poor 
education and resettlement support) contribute to the high re-offending rate for 
detained children which remains consistently at around 70%.  
 
Different Institutions, Different Experiences 
The picture, therefore, is bleak, and it is also complex.  Children sentenced to custody 
are often highly vulnerable, having suffered significant prior disadvantage.
32
  For 
some children, incarceration compounds, rather than causes, some of the harms they 
experience.  Further, not all of the problems are confined to YOIs and STCs but exist 
throughout the secure estate, including in secure children’s homes.33   
Acknowledging these nuances does not however negate the fact that YOIs 
(and to some extent STCs) are especially detrimental to children’s rights and 
wellbeing.   Both are penal institutions governed under the Prison Act 1952 and 
related rules
34
 and inspected by HM Inspectorate of Prisons. Although inspection 
reports show marked differences between individual institutions,
35
 they nonetheless 
                                                                                                                                                              
in Young Offender Institutions than Secure Training Centres’ (2014) 14 Youth Justice: An Int J 93; 
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales, ‘Learning Lessons Bulletin: Fatal Incidents 
Investigation Issue 3: Child Deaths’ (London 2013).  
28
 The YJB has dropped its target of placing children within 50 miles from their home. For the effect 
this has on children, see Howard League (n 25). 
29
 15 hours are required in YOIs, 25 in STCs, and 30 in SCHs.  See Ministry of Justice, Transforming 
Youth Custody: Putting Education at the Heart of Detention (Cmnd 8564, 2013) 8. 
30
 Centre for Social Justice, ‘Prisons Failing to Educate Young Offenders, warns CSJ’ (1 May 2013). 
31
 Children Act 1989, ss 23A-24D.  See further K Hollingsworth, ‘Securing Responsibility, Achieving 
Parity? The Legal Support for Children Leaving Custody’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 22.   
32
 J Jacobson, B Bhadwa, T Gyateng, G Hunter, and M Hough, Punishing Disadvantage: A Profile of 
Children in Custody (London 2010). 
33
 Self-harm is higher amongst girls (every though girls are not placed in YOIs) and restraint is used 
proportionately more against girls and younger children (who are prioritised for placement in SCHs).  
34
 Prison Service Orders/Instructions (see PSI 1600), the YOI Rules 2000, and the Secure Training 
Rules 1998.  Guidance and targets are also set by the YJB and Ministry of Justice.  
35
 Compare eg Warren Hill (which received a relatively positive inspection) and Feltham (where the 
levels of violence are ‘unacceptably high’, where many children are hungry and frightened and have no 
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reveal serious systemic failings.
36
  The problems in YOIs have been identified as 
stemming from the size of the institutions, the high staff-child ratio,
37
 and other 
structural issues deriving from the use of adult-designed systems that are not 
appropriate for young people.
38
  STCs are used for younger and more vulnerable 
children
39
 and each accommodates between 50-80 minors with a staff-child ratio of 
1:3.4.  Although all STCs have received quite positive inspections in the past year, 
they have a well-documented history of over-reliance on unlawful restraint
40
 and 
some continue to use pain-inducing techniques.
41
  In contrast, secure children’s homes 
are small,
42
 care-based institutions run by local authorities and subject to regulations 
made under the Care Standards Act 2000 and inspected by OFSTED.  They are safer 
for children,
43
 have better educational outcomes,
44
 and overall the reported 
experiences of children are positive.
45
   This appears primarily to be because the units 
are small and members of staff are able to foster good relationships.
46
   
Most of the evidence suggests that when children are deprived of their liberty 
in England and Wales, their rights and wellbeing are much better protected in SCHs 
than in YOIs (with STCs being historically poor but improving).  And yet, care-based 
                                                                                                                                                              
confidence in staff to keep them safe).  Those institutions that did better against the measures used by 
the Inspector (safety, respect, purposeful activity, and resettlement) were smaller, had better – friendly 
and more individual - relationships between staff and children, had social workers and language and 
speech therapists on site, and provided children with education and work that was stimulating and 
challenging.  See the reports on http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/ <accessed 3 June 
2014>.  
36
 Relating to safeguarding and self-harm, bullying, routine strip-searching, long periods spent in cells, 
poor food, not enough time for exercise, and poor record keeping; all of which reiterates the data 
presented above, most of which relates to YOIs. See generally E Kennedy, Children and Young People 
in Custody 2012–13: An Analysis of 15–18-year-olds’ Perceptions of their Experiences in Young 
Offender Institutions (London 2013). 
37
 Usually 1:15 (eg 4 officers on a wing of 60 children). 
38
 Including inadequate child specific training (Howard League (n 5)), the systems of rewards and 
sanctions, and the monitoring of self-harm and suicide (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (n 27) 
paras 3.3 and 3.2 respectively).  
39
 Boys aged 12-14, girls up to 18, and vulnerable boys with greater needs aged 15-17. 
40
 See R (C) v SSJ (n 11) and R (on the Application of the Children’s Rights Alliance for England) v 
Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 34. 
41
 A new system of ‘Minimising and Managing Physical Restraint’ is to be introduced for STCs and 
YOIs. 
42
 Usually accommodating between 6-40 children, with a high staff-child ratio. 
43
 There are fewer deaths (only one in the last 20 years: see Howard League for Penal Reform, ‘Future 
Insecure: Secure Children’s Homes in England and Wales’ (London, undated)) and children report 
feeling safer (OFSTED, Life in Secure Care: A Report by the Children's Rights Director for England 
(London 2009) and YJB/NCB, A Review of Safeguarding in the Secure Estate 2008 (London 2008)). 
44
 See D Ellicott, ‘The Effectiveness of Educational Provision for Young People in Secure Children’s 
Homes’ (NTU Alternative Futures Conference 2013), available at 
http://www.securechildrenshomes.org.uk/the-effectiveness-of-educational-provision-for-young-people-
in-secure-childrens-homes/ <accessed 28 May 2014>.   
45
 OFSTED (n 43). 
46
 YJB/NCB (n 43).   
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institutions are the exception rather than the rule. 
47
  Only those children who fit an 
appropriate image of ‘child’ – one who is vulnerable, needy, or especially young – are 
placed in an SCH rather than a YOI or STC. This is reflected in the groups who are 
given priority for placement in SCHs (girls, younger boys, and boys at risk of suicide, 
self harm or who are otherwise vulnerable) and in the (non statutory) criteria that 
governs individual placements.
48
  Prioritising the youngest and most vulnerable 
children for care-based homes is ostensibly justifiable when budgetary constraints 
mean there are not enough beds to go round.
49
  However, since the custody rate has 
dropped it has become obvious from the YJB’s commissioning decisions that the use 
of prison-type accommodation over care-based homes for the majority of children is 
not (only) due to financial restraints. Rather than fill empty SCH beds with children 
from YOIs or STCs, the YJB has instead consistently reduced the number of places it 
commissions in children’s homes.50  It has maintained that this is not a response to 
public sector cuts, but because its ‘sweeps’ of the secure estate failed to find 
‘vulnerable’ children in YOIs who should instead be placed in SCHs.51  Such claims 
are hard to believe given the evidence of self harm and suicide.  However, it is clear 
that entitlement to a place in a care-based home in England and Wales is coupled to 
notions of ‘vulnerability’, and those who fall outside its narrowly defined parameters, 
because they are too old, too male, too mature, or too resilient, are subject to a penal 
regime that is, in fundamental ways, indistinguishable from that used for adults.  
 
The Current Legal Problem: The (F)utility of the Law and Human Rights for 
Children in the Secure Estate: Challenging Placement Decisions 
 
                                                        
47
 In 2012-13, 74% of children were held in YOIs, compared to 14% in STCs and 8% in SCHs: see 
Ministry of Justice/YJB (n 15) 41. Girls are no longer held in YOIs. 
48
 ‘Vulnerability’ is no longer explicitly used to structure placement decisions but the relevant factors 
map on to the concept nonetheless. These are the child’s welfare as ‘a priority’, risk factors, risk of 
harm to the child herself and to others, previous history in the secure estate, specific needs, co-
defendant/gang related issues, and the availability of beds: see https://www.justice.gov.uk/youth-
justice/custody/placing-young-people-in-custody/placement-decisions-and-reviews <accessed 18 July 
2014>. 
49
 The average place costs £215,000 per year in an SCH, £160,00 in an STC, and £60,000 in a YOI. 
Ministry of Justice, above n 29. 
50
 From 297 a decade ago to 138 in just 9 homes in April 2014: see YJB announcement, reported on 
Community Care, available at http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2014/02/12/youth-justice-board-
reduces-secure-childrens-home-beds/#.U4X3Ji_wumE <accessed 28 May 2014>. Also see R (on the 
Application of Secure Services Ltd and Others) v Youth Justice Board and Others [2009] EWHC 2347, 
[63] and the Justice Committee (n 5) para 81. 
51
 ibid. 
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Given the differences between the three types of institution it is unsurprising that 
children and their advocates have turned to the courts to challenge issues relating to 
placement.  What the limited amount of case law suggests is that although children 
have successfully used common law judicial review principles to overturn individual 
placement decisions, human rights arguments have been less useful.  Two reported 
decisions - R (on the application of SR) v Nottingham Magistrates’ Court52 and R (on 
the application of ML) v Youth Justice Board
53
 - are used to exemplify this point. 
 In SR, a 16-year-old boy challenged the decision to remand him to custody 
rather than to local authority care (and thus placement in a secure children’s home).54  
At that time, 15-16 year old boys were only remanded to local authority care if they 
were vulnerable.
55
  The district judge had held that although SR was ‘very needy’ and 
an ‘emotionally damaged young man’, he was not vulnerable ‘because he was neither 
emotionally nor physically immature in comparison with the average 16-year-old 
boy’.56  SR challenged this decision and was successful but only because there had 
been a breach of a procedural legitimate expectation, not because the decision was 
wrong per se.  Similarly, and more recently, ML successfully argued on procedural 
grounds (failure to consult) that the decision to transfer him from an STC to a YOI 
was unlawful.  However, his claim that the decision disproportionately restricted his 
Article 8 ECHR rights was rejected even when his best interests were ostensibly 
treated as a primary interest.
57
 
Although caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from limited case 
law,
58
 the decisions in SR and ML highlight two important limitations of the law and 
practice in relation to placement decisions.  First, SR demonstrates that vulnerability 
is narrowly understood as immaturity and risk of self-harm and that it is a relative 
concept only.  This perpetuates the social and legal construction of children in YOIs 
                                                        
52
 SR (n 11). 
53
 [2013] EWHC 3083. 
54
 On remand placements, historical and current, see K Hollingsworth, ‘Youth Justice Reform in the 
Big Society’ (2012) 34 J Social Welfare and Family L 245. 
55
 See Children and Young Persons Act 1969 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a ‘confusingly complex set of provisions’ (R on the application of (VA a 
litigation friend) v Lewisham Youth Court v Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] EWHC 1193 
(Admin)).  See further Hollingsworth, ibid.  
56
 SR (n 11) [22], [23]. 
57
 In line with ZH (Tanzania) (n 11). 
58
 But see also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte J; R v Same, ex parte B (The 
Independent 20 July 1998) and the issues highlighted in Scholes v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1343, especially [71].  Unreported and settled cases might present a 
different picture.  
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as not vulnerable even though they are likely to have suffered earlier disadvantage 
and be very troubled.
59
   Secondly, these cases suggest that the ECHR is of limited 
utility in challenging placement decisions because the content of the rights is 
narrowly construed and the threshold for engagement high.  The apparent rights-
compatibility that is thus implied not only deprives the child of a remedy but also 
confers a legitimacy on YOIs that the empirical evidence suggests is absent.
60
    
Legal challenges that have been more systemic in nature and aimed either 
directly at the lack of SCH places (the commissioning of beds by the YJB) or 
indirectly (the criteria used for prioritisation between groups) have similarly been 
unsuccessful on rights-based grounds.  In SR again, it was argued that the statutory 
framework that then governed remand was discriminatory in favour of girls.  At that 
time, all girls aged 12-16 were remanded to local authority care and 15-16 year old 
boys were placed in an STC or YOI unless they could show they were vulnerable ‘by 
reason of his physical or emotional immaturity or a propensity of his to harm himself’ 
(and a place was available).
61
  The court held that the statutory framework was 
discriminatory but this was justified because otherwise older girls would be held 
either in adult prisons or a long distance from home in breach of Article 8 ECHR.  
The court dismissed an argument made by SR’s counsel that the lack of available 
places in SCHs sufficient to accommodate all vulnerable children of both genders had 
resulted partly from legislative changes that led to an increase in the number of 
younger children being placed on remand (thus taking up the available SCH beds).  
Lord Justice Brooke stated that ‘[i]n a democratic society, if our elected 
representatives believe that it is desirable or expedient to detain more children, and 
younger children, in secure accommodation than was previously thought desirable or 
expedient, that is a choice they are entitled to make’.62     
The court was similarly unwilling to overstep its institutional limits in R (on 
the Application of Secure Services Ltd and Others) v Youth Justice Board and 
Others
63
 when the YJB’s decision to decommission beds in two secure children’s 
                                                        
59
 For evidence see again Jacobson and others (n 32) and Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (n 27). 
60
 See D Scott, ‘The Politics of Prisoner Legal Rights’ (2013) 52 Howard J Criminal Justice 233, 236-
37.  On the centrality of humane regimes and procedural justice to legitimacy within prisons, see JR 
Sparkes and AE Bottoms, ‘Legitimacy and Order in Prisons’ (1995) 46 British J Sociology 45. 
61
 See n 55.  Those provisions have now been replaced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act.   This Act allows for ‘remand to youth detention accommodation’, which can be an 
STC or a YOI. 
62
 SR (n 11) [103]. 
63
 Secure Services (n 50). 
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homes in London was subject to judicial review.  It was claimed, inter alia, that the 
reduction of places in SCHs would result in more vulnerable children being 
accommodated in YOIs and thus exposed to a risk of significant harm in breach of 
Articles 2, 3, and 8 ECHR.  Specifically, it was argued that when read in accordance 
with Articles 3 and 6 UNCRC
64
 the positive duty on the state to detain a vulnerable 
child in suitable accommodation constituted a ‘primary duty’ to put in place a 
legislative and administrative framework that deterred such breaches of their rights; it 
was not only an aspect of the positive duty to take operational decisions where there 
was an identified significant risk to a specific child.  However, Sir Thayne Forbes 
held that the claimants did ‘not come anywhere close’ to establishing that the decision 
not to award the contracts engaged or breached the state’s duties under the ECHR and 
that ‘in any event, no breach can be demonstrated without establishing that (i) the 
YJB’s demand calculation for SCH places is flawed; (ii) children who could only 
have been appropriately placed in a SCH will not be placed elsewhere and (iii) in 
general terms, conditions in STCs and YOIs are such as to breach Articles 2, 3 and 8 
ECHR’.65  The court held that they had not. 
We can conclude, therefore, that although the domestic courts have accepted 
‘that individual cases have shown breaches of rights’ in YOIs66 and that SCHs are 
preferable to YOIs,
67
 it has not been accepted that ‘the normal conditions of detention 
in STCs and YOIs ipso facto amount to breach of any [ECHR] Articles in question’.68  
Only children who are sufficiently vulnerable are placed in SCHs; a welfarist rather 
than a rights-based approach.
69
   Thus the continued use of YOIs for the under 18s 
remains lawful and the courts instead expect children whose rights (legal or human) 
have been or might be infringed within a YOI to litigate individually.  However, 
doing so depends on having access to a system of law that is able to protect those 
                                                        
64
 The best interests provision and the obligation on states to ensure to the maximum extent possible 
the survival and development of the child. 
65
 Secure Services (n 50) [112].  
66
 ibid [111]. 
67
 SR (n 11). 
68
 Secure Services (n 50) [111].   
69
 See S Bessell and T Gal, ‘Forming Partnerships: The Human Rights of Children in Need of Care and 
Protection’ (2009) 17 Int J Children's Rights 283; J Waldron, ‘The Role of Rights in Practical 
Reasoning: “Rights” versus “Needs”’ (2000) 4 J Ethics 115, 131: ‘Both rights and needs amount to a 
demand that certain interests be attended to; but only rights-talk presents those interests in the voice of 
one who would be a fully-fledged member of society, who is not going to go away, and who expects to 
be taken seriously as an enduring source of continuing demands’. 
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rights, something which recent and proposed legal developments are likely to 
undermine.  
 
The Current Legal Problem: Incarcerated Children and Access to Justice 
 
The potential and actual threats, to access to justice for incarcerated children come 
from two sources: reform to the system of legal aid and the future repeal of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
  
Legal Aid Reform 
The first and so far most significant limitation to access to justice for incarcerated 
children results from the 2013 legal aid reforms.
70
   For prisoners of any age, criminal 
legal aid is now restricted to ‘liberty cases’,71 meaning that for most detained children 
(who lack access to their own financial arrangements) legal advice and representation 
in relation to treatment and sentencing matters will no longer be available.
72
  Instead, 
children, like all other prisoners, are expected to rely on judicial review, complaints to 
the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (whose decisions are not binding), and the 
internal prisons complaints systems.   The reforms have been subject to immense 
criticism (including from the Joint Committee on Human Rights
73
), much of which 
applies with added force in the case of children.   
The first criticism that can be made of the reforms is that individuals in prison 
are amongst the most vulnerable in society and the condition of imprisonment leaves 
them open to rights infringements that would not occur in the outside world.  This is 
even more true for children who are not only likely to be physically weaker and 
psychological less robust than adults (though of course this varies on an individual 
                                                        
70
 See Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Part I, and the relevant 
regulations (The Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, SI 2013 No 9 amended by Criminal 
Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, SI 2013 No 2790).  See also Ministry of Justice, 
Transforming Legal Aid: Next Steps (London 2013).  
71
 Cases that engage Articles 5(4) or 6 ECHR; eg parole hearings or disciplinary hearings that lead to 
an increase in sentence. On the importance of legally aided legal advice to children facing a deprivation 
of liberty, see S v Miller [2001] SC 977. 
72
 Treatment matters include educational provision, food, incentives and privileges, correspondence, 
treatment from staff (such as bullying), visits, behavioural courses, and mother and baby unit 
placement.  Sentencing matters relate eg to resettlement provision or the use of segregation/loss of 
association. 
73
 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights The Implications for 
Access to Justice of the Government's Proposals to Reform Judicial Review: Thirteenth Report of 
Session 2013–14 (HL Paper 174, HC 868, 2013). See also P Kaufmann and T Owen, ‘The Price of 
Dignity and Liberty: Legal  Aid for Prisoners’ [2013] European Human Rights L Rev 482. 
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basis), but who are also likely to have suffered a range of disadvantages prior to 
incarceration that compound those vulnerabilities.
74
  Moreover, children are living 
outside their family home and thus away from those people who would ordinarily be 
expected (both legally and socially) to protect their rights.
75
    
Secondly, there are specific legal issues at stake for children in and leaving 
custody that are unlikely to be resolved without legal advice.
76
  A key matter is 
children’s resettlement and the use of the Children Act 1989 to secure local authority 
support when the child leaves custody. Given (amongst other things) the complexity 
of the statutory eligibility criteria, detained children are unlikely to realise that upon 
leaving custody they may become a ‘child in need’ or a ‘care leaver’ under the 
Children Act 1989, and that such a status imposes significant duties on local 
authorities (which can include, for example, a duty to provide accommodation). 
Furthermore, even if a child has the requisite knowledge, the primary mechanism 
available for seeking redress – the prison internal complaints systems – relates only to 
the duties of the penal institution and provides no remedy against a local authority.  
Thirdly, like adult prisoners, detained children cannot access free sources of 
legal advice such as the Citizens’ Advice Bureau and, as Evans notes, there is limited 
and highly controlled access to legal sources on the internet.
77
  Moreover, numerous 
studies show that children in prison are more likely to have low literacy skills, low IQ, 
special educational needs, and low educational achievement, which means that their 
capacities necessary to articulate a complaint, and to understand the legal issues at 
stake, may be lacking.
78
  Many detained children are simply not equipped to act on 
their own behalf.
79
    
                                                        
74
 Jacobson and others (n 32). 
75
 On which see the discussion in section four below. 
76
 The same is true in relation to liberty cases, where the effect of a short extension to a child’s sentence 
following a disciplinary hearing can have long term consequences in terms of the duties owed to him 
by the local authority, if the effect is to disqualify the child from ‘care-leaver’ status.  See R (on the 
application of M) v Chief Magistrate [2010] EWHC 433 (Admin). 
77
 M Evans, ‘Prison Law Funding under Threat from Transforming Legal Aid ‘Reforms’’ (2013), 
available at http://www.lag.org.uk/magazine/2013/05/prison-law-funding-under-threat-from-
transforming-legal-aid-%27reforms%27.aspx, <accessed 30 May 2014>.  
78
 See, inter alia, Jacobson and others (n 32) and Youth Justice Board, Barriers to Engaging in 
Education, Training and Employment’ (London 2006), which reported that 25% of children in the 
youth justice system have identified special educational needs, 46% are rated as underachieving at 
school and 29% have difficulties with literacy and numeracy. 
79
 On the need to provide children with special assistance in criminal proceedings, see V v United 
Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121; R (on the Application of K) v Parole Board [2006] EWHC 2413 
(Admin); [2006] All ER (D) 75; R (on the Application of HC) (a Child, by His Litigation Friend CC) v 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department; the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] 
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Finally, prison internal complaints mechanisms are an inadequate substitute 
for legal advice.
80
  They lack the necessary independence and are perceived as less 
independent by children, who also see the complaints system as selective and slow 
and who fear reprisals if they bring a complaint.
81
  In a judicial review brought by the 
Children’s Rights Alliance for England in 2013, it was reported that only 2% of the 
children subject to the unlawful regime of painful restraint that was used in STCs 
until 2008 used the internal prison mechanisms to make a complaint. This suggests 
that detained children neither trust nor understand the internal complaints processes.
82   
These findings are compounded by evidence that children in general do not have a 
sophisticated or well-developed understanding of their human rights and may not 
recognize that the treatment they have suffered constitutes a rights abuse.  And, where 
it is so recognized, the research evidence also suggests that children feel unable to 
stand up for themselves.
83
  Furthermore, complaints are backward looking and do not 
help children to achieve support in relation to securing future rights, such as 
placement changes or resettlement.  Finally, complaints may not be taken seriously 
when the coercive backdrop of the threat of legal action is absent.
84
 
Despite the many criticisms that have been leveled at the legal aid reform for 
restricting access to justice and despite the detrimental impact it is likely to have on 
the rights protection of detained children, the provisions have not (yet) been found to 
be unlawful.   In March 2014 the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Prisoners’ 
Advice Centre were refused permission to challenge the amendments to criminal legal 
aid for prisoners.
85
  The High Court dismissed all of the identified grounds of review
86
 
                                                                                                                                                              
EWHC 982 (Admin).  Parents may be unable to help and, like other sources of support (such as 
helplines), lack legal expertise. 
80
 See the Joint Committee on Human Rights (n 73). 
81
 Office of the Children’s Commissioner, Why Are They Going to Listen to Me? Young People’s 
Perspectives on Complaints Systems in the Youth Justice System and the Secure Estate (London 2012) 
24ff. 
82
 CRAE (n 40). 
83
 On both of these points see M Ruck and others ‘Adolescents’ and Children’s Knowledge About 
Rights: Some Evidence for How Young People View Rights in Their Own Lives’ (1998) 21 J 
Adolescence 275; C Goodwin-De Faria and V Marinos, ‘Youth Understanding & Assertion of Legal 
Rights: Examining the Roles of Age and Power’ (2012) 20 Int J Children's Rights 343.  On the impact 
of prior maltreatment and spending time in care on children’s understanding of rights see M Peterson-
Badali, M D Ruck, and J Bone, ‘Rights Conceptions of Maltreated Children Living in State Care’ 
(2008) 16 Int J Children’s Rights 99.   
84
 N Whitty, ‘Human Rights as Risk: UK Prisons and the Management of Risk and Rights’ (2011) 13 
Punishment & Society 123. 
85
 R (on the Application of the Howard League for Penal and Reform and the Prisoners' Advice 
Service) v the Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 709 (admin).   
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including the substantive issue that the reforms restricted access to justice in 
contravention with the common law and Article 6 ECHR.
87
  There was no discussion 
in the judgment of the specific impact on children and for the time being the 
regulations remain in place.
88
  Thus, instead of having access to lawyers for advice 
regarding their treatment in detention, as noted, children are expected to rely on 
internal prisons complaints systems, complaints to the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman, and judicial review.  In addition to the limitations of internal complaints 
mechanisms that have already been outlined, judicial review also fails to provide a 
suitable alternative because of the strict time limits to bring a claim (three months), 
the requirement that children have a litigation friend, and because firms with judicial 
review legal aid contracts are limited in the number of cases they can bring a year 
(‘matter starts’), making it difficult for them to absorb additional prison-related cases 
into their workload.
89
  None of the alternatives to criminal legal aid are therefore 
sufficient. 
 
Human Rights Act 1998: RIP? 
The second (potential) limit to access to justice for detained children arises if the 
Conservative Party are elected with a majority in 2015 and repeal the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA).
90
  Although, as noted above, the common law has been of greater 
utility to incarcerated children than the ECHR, where HRA challenges have been 
successful the impact has been significant.
91
  In addition, the availability of the HRA 
as the basis for litigating rights has a wider, indirect effect.  Whitty has argued that 
even though prison environments may not be ‘saturated with rights discourses’ and 
even though judges are not inevitably the ‘defenders of prisoners’ rights’, the increase 
in human-rights based litigation, even when it is unsuccessful, has had an important 
systemic impact by increasing and broadening the scope of legal risk within the prison 
                                                                                                                                                              
86
 Including adequacy of the consultation process, irrationality, fairness, and a breach of the Lord 
Chancellor’s duty to protect the rule of law under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  
87
 The court relied on R v Lord Chancellor ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575, 581; Airey v Ireland 
(1979-80) 2 EHRR 305; and Hooper v United Kingdom [2005] 41 EHRR 1 to support its conclusion 
that legal aid was not, in most cases, a component of the right to access to justice. 
88
 The challenge was probably premature; another is likely to be brought when or if it results in unfair 
decision-making in relation to a particular child.   
89
 See the evidence from the Association of Prison Lawyers to the Joint Committee (n 73).  
90
 A Travis, ‘Conservatives promise to scrap the Human Rights Act after next election’ The Guardian, 
30 September 2013. 
91
 The litigation involving the unlawful use of restraint in STCs is one of the clearest examples: see n 
11 and n 40.  
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sector.
92
  Managerial controls now use rights-based measures in order to avoid 
litigation that is costly in financial and reputational terms,
93
 thus helping to secure 
rights compliance and rights consciousness within the prison sector.
94
  Therefore, 
even though the HRA has not provided a panacea for detained children - and as noted 
above it has certainly not led to an abolition of YOIs or STCs – it can nonetheless 
improve directly and indirectly the way children are treated in custody.   Its repeal, 
especially when combined with the restrictions on legal aid, is likely to diminish 
further the rights and wellbeing of children in YOIs.  
 
Assuming Responsibility for Incarcerated Children: A Rights Case for Care-
based Homes 
 
One solution to the current legal problem facing children in YOIs is for care-based 
homes to be extended across the entire juvenile secure estate.  So far, this has proved 
unattainable both politically and legally.  As the preceding discussion has shown, 
there is no ‘right’ to a certain type of secure accommodation in domestic law.  UN 
Rules do require the use of small, open units
95
 but even the existence of a relevant 
international standard does not guarantee its protection in English law, not only 
because of limitations in enforceability but because such provisions raise ‘unresolved 
conflicts of a theoretical nature’.96  Specifically here, on what basis can we justify 
special treatment for all under 18s and not those who have reached adulthood, where 
the factors that are ordinarily drawn on to differentiate the two groups (vulnerability 
and capacity) are even less distinct in criminal justice than elsewhere?  Theorising the 
conceptual basis underpinning the claim for care-based homes addresses this by 
allowing a coherent justification to be given for treating all children, regardless of 
their age or gender, differently (and preferentially) from all adults even though there 
may be few differences empirically.
97
  Drawing on theorisations of children’s rights 
                                                        
92
 Whitty (n 84). 
93
 What Whitty refers to respectively as ‘legal risk’ and ‘legal risk +’. 
94
 Though on the narrowness of how rights are understood in managerialist systems see A Liebling and 
B Crewe, ‘Prisons Beyond the New Penology’ in J Simon and J R Sparkes (eds), The Sage Handbook 
of Punishment and Society (London 2013). 
95
 Rule 30, Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (n 10). 
96
 Beijing Rules (n 10) and K Hollingsworth, ‘Theorising Children’s Rights in Youth Justice: The 
Significance of Autonomy and Foundational Rights’ (2013) 76 Modern L Rev 1046, 1048, and 
generally see L Ferguson, ‘Not Merely Rights for Children but Children's Rights: The Theory Gap and 
the Assumption of the Importance of Children's Rights’ (2013) 21 Int J Children’s Rights 177. 
97
 For a theorization that considers the implications of the child’s status as future rights-holder to her 
rights in criminal justice, rather than the child’s present rights status (as here), see Hollingsworth, ibid. 
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also explains the content of the right: why care and home are more than linguistically 
important.  This then provides a theoretical foundation for the development of a new 
domestic legal right for incarcerated children: the right to a care-based home.  
 
Justifying Age-specific Rights: Children’s Citizenship and Incarceration   
The special treatment of children as a distinct group of rights-holders is often justified 
by pointing to their greater physical or psychological vulnerability or relatedly, as in 
the preamble of the UN Convention, their physical and mental immaturity when 
compared with adults.
98
  However, physicality-derived justifications for age-based 
boundaries are, says Archard, arbitrary and unreliable:
99
 vulnerability and immaturity 
vary, not only between persons of the same age but temporally across an individual’s 
lifetime;
100
 and neither necessarily diminish according to a particular chronology.  
Furthermore, where vulnerability and immaturity are drawn on to justify a particular 
right, the strength of the claim may be lost or undermined in the face of conflicting 
(empirical) evidence.  For example, if it can be shown that many adult prisoners are 
(empirically) highly vulnerable or conversely that some incarcerated children are very 
mature (or at least constructed as such
101
), then the case for a distinct penal regime for 
minors, such as the use of care-based homes, is weakened.   
This does not, however, necessitate a rejection of age as an appropriate basis 
on which to confer special rights on children.
102
  Age is significant because of its 
relationship to citizenship and, when citizenship is conceptualized, a clear 
demarcation between adults and children emerges.  When this is applied to the 
context of incarceration (because it is as citizens - as political actors not moral agents 
- that we are held criminally responsible), the attribution of a uniquely children’s right 
can be justified.  This conceptualization also provides a foundation for the interests 
that I assert should be protected by this right.  
                                                        
98
 In relation to children in prison, see para 2 of the United Nations Rules for Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty (n 10). 
99
 See D Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (London, 2004) pp 85ff and E Buss, ‘What the Law 
Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development’ (2009) 38 Hofstra L Rev 13. 
100
 Martha Fineman describes vulnerability as a universal, inevitable, and enduring aspect of the human 
condition.  See ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale 
JL and Feminism 1.   
101
 See eg R v Wellington [2012] EWCA Crim 1696. 
102
 See eg R Dixon and M Nussbaum’s ‘unique vulnerability’ (I will return to this below) in ‘Children's 
Rights and a Capabilities Approach’ (2012) 97 Cornell L Rev 549; Andrew Franklin-Hall’s life-stage 
approach in ‘On Becoming an Adult: Autonomy and the Moral Relevance of Life Stages’ (2013) 63 
Philosophical Q 223; or Emily Buss’s concern with children’s potential (n 99). 
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Conceptualising Children’s Citizenship 
Citizenship is a highly contested concept but at its core it denotes community 
membership and equality in civic participation.
103
  It is a concept that carries  
importance because of what it signifies about inclusion/exclusion and because of its 
relationship to the formal attribution of rights.
104
  It implies (legally and culturally) 
equality, belonging, value, and reciprocal responsibilities; it confers a status that 
determines the rights and worth of groups and individuals within that community.  It 
is for this reason that some traditional ideas of citizenship are criticised for privileging 
the position and experience of particular groups and conferring on them the status of 
‘citizen’ to the exclusion of others.105  This is most clearly the case in relation to the 
‘core’ meaning of citizenship as political citizenship, which denies membership to 
those - including children - who cannot vote or stand for public office.
106
  It is evident 
too in extended versions of citizenship, including TH Marshall’s classic tripartite 
articulation of civil, political, and social citizenship rights,
107
 where the position of 
children as ‘partial’ or ‘demi-citizens’ is further entrenched by the broadening of the 
conditions of ‘full’ membership.108  
One response to the exclusion of children from many aspects of citizenship 
has been to redefine the concept to take account of their own experiences and 
understandings of its meaning.  Ruth Lister, for example, highlights the centrality to 
                                                        
103
 Duff defines it as ‘equal, mutually respectful participation in the civic enterprise’: RA Duff, 
‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and the Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and SP Green (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford 2011) 119.  
104
 Easton describes citizenship as ‘Janus-faced’: by conferring rights regardless of characteristics such 
as race or sex it implies equality and universalism, but simultaneously it excludes those defined as 
‘non-citizens’:  S Easton, ‘Constructing Citizenship: Making Way for Prisoners’ Rights’ (2008) 30 J 
Social Welfare and Family L 127. 
105
 However, even for those groups who are ‘insiders’ and enjoy the status of citizen by virtue of 
political rights, the purported universality of citizenship (its disregard for gender, race, class) can act as 
a mask for social inequalities and social injustice; meaningful citizenship remains elusive: see I Young, 
‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ (1989) 99 Ethics 250. 
106
 On the consequences of this for children’s ability to influence political debates and have their 
interests taken into account see A Nolan, ‘The Child as “Democratic Citizen”: Challenging the 
Participation Gap’ [2010] Public L 767. 
107
 TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge 1950). 
108
 eg by conceptualising the citizen as worker.  For similar feminist critiques, see S Walby, ‘Is 
Citizenship Gendered? (1994) 28 Sociology 379; A Phillips, ‘Citizenship and Feminist Theory’ in G 
Andrews (ed), Citizenship (London 1991) 78; C Pateman, ‘The Patriarchal Welfare State’ in C 
Pateman, The Disorder of Women (Cambridge 1989). 
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children of citizenship as the fulfilment of obligations and responsibilities.
109
  And, 
when understood as ‘citizenship in practice’, the many contributions that children 
make to public life (for example through formal structures such as youth councils, via 
proxies, during collective consultation processes, and in everyday activities in public 
spaces such as schools
110) can evidence children’s citizenship and strengthen their 
claims to ‘insider’ status.111  However, this type of extended cultural definition can 
conceal important age-based differences that affect how children enjoy the benefits 
and are able to meet the obligations of citizenship.
112
  It also obscures a point I will 
return to below: restrictions on children’s political and social citizenship mean that 
conceptually (and, for many, empirically
113) children’s lives are lived in the private 
sphere to a much greater degree than are the lives of adults.  
Within the criminal justice context it is particularly important not to mask 
children’s exclusion from many of the core elements of political and social citizenship 
by adopting a ‘difference-centred’ 114  or cultural approach to citizenship. A more 
inclusive definition of citizenship can be (mis)appropriated – as it was by New 
Labour - to defend the subjection of young children to accountability before the 
criminal courts.
115
  A narrower, liberal rights-based approach to citizenship that 
highlights children’s exclusion is taken here because it is within the space between 
partial and full citizenship that the State’s obligation to provide differential and 
special treatment to incarcerated children emerges and provides the basis for 
normative rights-claims that are not dependent on empirically determined and 
individually variable characteristics.   
 
Citizenship and Incarceration 
                                                        
109
 For a nuanced account of children’s citizenship, see R Lister, ‘Why Citizenship: Where, When and 
How Children?’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in L 693 and R Lister, ‘Unpacking Children’s 
Citizenship’ in A Invernizzi and J Williams (eds), Children and Citizenship (London 2008). 
110
 EKM Tisdall, JM Davis, and M Gallagher, ‘Reflecting upon Children and Young People’s 
Participation in the UK‘ (2008) 16 Int J Children’s Rights 419. 
111
 Although children’s participation in policy processes may remain tokenistic.  See Tisdell and others 
ibid; M Arnott, ‘Public Policy, Governance and Participation in the UK: A Space for Children?’ (2008) 
16 Int J Children’s Rights 355 and R Hinton, ‘Children’s Participation and Good Governance: 
Limitations of the Theoretical Literature’ (2008) 16 Int J Children’s Rights 285. 
112
  See Young (n 105) 257 and Lister (n 109).   
113
 See S Holloway and G Valentine (eds), Children’s Geographies: Playing, Living, Learning 
(London, 2000) cited in G Hallden, ‘Children's Views of Family, Home and House’ in P Christensen 
and M O’Brien (eds), Children in the City: Home Neighbourhood and Community (London 2003). 
114
 Lister (n 109). 
115
 See especially the rhetoric of New Labour, captured best in Home Office, No More Excuses: A New 
Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales (1997, Cmnd 3809). 
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I focus on citizenship because my starting point when thinking about criminal 
responsibility is that we are held accountable as citizens for engaging in behaviour 
that has been politically defined as a public wrong.
116
  The importance of highlighting 
the ‘political character of crime’117 – that crime and criminal justice systems exist 
solely within political systems – is that it draws attention not only to the responsibility 
that is owed by us but also the responsibility owed to us by the political community 
(represented by the State) that is calling us to account.
118
  Reciprocity is therefore 
central to the criminal responsibility of citizens.
119
  There are multiple ways in which 
this reciprocity can be manifested within a system of criminal justice.  For example, 
for Duff it gives rise to a ‘moral bar to trial’ if an individual or group has been legally 
and effectively excluded from the benefits of citizenship;
120
 or it can be used to 
further support the idea of a ‘hardship defence’;121 it might inform sentencing;122 or it 
could be translated into a reparatory obligation to redress the ‘secondary pains of 
punishment’.123  The particular focus here is narrower; it considers the significance of 
reciprocity for one particular group: children deprived of their liberty. 
 Historically, the reciprocity in the relationship between prisoners and the state 
was, in citizenship terms, typically conceptualised as absent: incarceration constituted 
‘civic death’.124  However, even during the nineteenth century, prisons were locations 
to reform and ‘mould’ citizens who remained partially within the political 
                                                        
116
 A Ristroph, ‘Responsibility for the Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and SP Green (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford 2010) 107.  See also RA Duff, ‘A Criminal Law for Citizens’ 
(2010) 14 Theoretical Criminology 293; Duff (n 103); M Dubber, ‘Citizenship and Penal Law’ (2010) 
13 New Criminal L Rev 190.  A citizen-focused account of punishment is usually associated with a 
social contract approach: see (inter alia) A Goldman, ‘Toward a New Theory of Punishment’ (1982) 1 
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community,
125
 at least in contrast to the completely exclusionary forms of punishment 
that went before.
126
  Vaughan has thus described prisoners as ‘conditional citizens’ 
who exist in a liminal state between inclusion and exclusion:  
 
The relationship between punishment and citizenship is then conditional 
in two senses: the first is that one’s claim to citizenship is granted only if 
one abides by an accepted standard of behavior and punishment may be 
imposed if one does not live up to this standard; second, while undergoing 
this punishment, one is no longer a full citizen yet neither is one 
completely rejected.  Instead one occupies the purgatory of being a 
‘conditional citizen’.127    
 
Although incarceration necessarily entails some restriction of citizenship (as Vaughan 
notes some privileges must be forgone and inclusion within the citizenry cannot be 
total if prison is to be effective
128
) the state retains obligations to prisoners as 
(conditional) citizens; reciprocity is not totally lost.  This is reflected in the obligation 
to rehabilitate offenders (for example)
129
 and also in Lord Wilberforce’s classic 
statement in Raymond v Honey that a convicted prisoner, ‘in spite of his 
imprisonment, retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by 
necessary implication’.130   
Since this statement was made in 1983 there has been significant progress in 
the development of prisoners’ rights in England and Wales 131  but nonetheless 
disagreements continue about how far citizenship rights extend into penal 
institutions.
132
  For Goldman, it is the least restriction of rights ‘necessary for 
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maintaining acceptable community relations amongst citizens, until full return to 
community membership and full restoration of rights is achieved’,133 whereas van Zyl 
Smit draws on Kelk’s concept of ‘rechtsburgerskap’ (the ‘citizenship of rights’) to 
argue that civil rights should not be understood in a narrow sense but as ‘all the 
human rights that inhabitants of modern democracies enjoy, whether they are citizens 
in the narrow legal sense of not’. 134   From here, he identifies the limit of the 
restriction of rights as being the prohibition on degrading and inhuman behaviour.  
Such rights (the prisoners’ rights qua ‘conditional citizen’) also extend to incarcerated 
children of course, albeit the content or threshold for engagement may be adapted.
135
  
But what is not captured by this citizenship analysis of prisoners’ rights is how, 
conceptually, children already exist in a liminal place between inclusion and 
exclusion: they may become conditional citizens when they are incarcerated but they 
also enter prison as partial citizens.  This must also be taken into account in order to 
understand the rights of detained children.  
 
Taking Account of Children’s Citizenship: The Right to be Parented 
The differential status of children qua citizens, and the relevance this has to their 
rights when incarcerated, is properly taken into account when it is recognised that the 
space between children’s partial citizenship and the full citizenship rights enjoyed by 
adults is not a void; it is filled by the duties that parents have to their children. 
Theoretically
136
 and legally
137
 parents are the primary duty-bearers of many children’s 
rights.  These rights are founded in the parent-child relationship, a relationship that is 
fundamentally different from the ‘public’ relations between citizens. 138   The 
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obligation that parents have to their children and the rights they protect can therefore 
be conceptualised as ‘private’ in order to differentiate them from citizenship rights 
against the State and our obligations to other citizens, qua citizen.  This does not 
mean, however, that such rights are beyond public concern.  As Dietz notes:  
 
Family practices, control over family property, the rights of children, the 
nature of schooling . . . all of those things, whether we like it or not, are 
potentially open to political control and may be politically determined.  
Even the decision to allow them to remain ‘private’ – that is, left in the 
hands of mothers, fathers, and individual citizens – is ultimately a political 
one.
139
   
 
The obligation on parents to protect the ‘private’ rights of children is the quid pro quo 
of family privacy: the state does not interfere in the upbringing of children provided 
certain minimum standards are met.
140
  The limits of parental freedom – what the 
basic requirements of parenting are - are therefore the proper subject of debate within 
the polity.   
One way of determining the scope and nature of parental duties is to look at 
existing laws and policies.
141
  Additionally, a normative approach can be taken to 
provide a benchmark against which the adequacy of such laws, policy and practice 
can be measured. Dixon and Nussbaum, for example, draw on the capabilities 
approach to justify and articulate the restrictions on parental freedom, arguing that 
parents should not act in a way that would limit one of the child’s ‘central 
capabilities’.142  What is particularly important about the ten central capabilities that 
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Nussbaum has identified in her ‘partial theory of social justice’143 is that they go 
beyond those interests we might expect to see, such as life and health (and the 
provisions needed to support both), to include highly relational capabilities, the 
development of which depend upon interactions and intimacy with others.  For 
children, this is significant because it maps on to the emphasis that they themselves 
place on ‘interdependence and reciprocity, rather than lonely autonomy, as central 
values’.144  It is also important to my argument because of my focus on the rights and 
duties between parent and child: the intimate relationship that for many children is 
central in their life.
145
   
Two of Nussbaum’s central capabilities are of most relevance here: (i) 
emotions (which include attachment, being able to give and receive love and care, 
‘not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety’) and (ii) 
affiliation (being able to live with and toward others and to show concern for other 
human beings, engaging in social interaction, empathy).
146
   These are capabilities that 
are particularly fertile
147
 and particularly fragile during childhood, and they depend 
(says Nussbaum) on the ‘supporting forms of human association’ (crucial for the 
development of emotions) and ‘protecting institutions’ (‘that constitute and nourish 
affiliation’).148  These are, in short, capabilities that for children are nurtured primarily 
by those carrying out the parental function within the ‘protecting institution’ of the 
family.  This is not to ignore the reality that some parents do not do this well or that 
families can be places of harm for children; I am not claiming that this is the lived 
experience of all children.  Rather, I am making a politically normative claim based 
on a general observation about the conditions within which children and young people 
thrive. Thus, taken together with the provision of the basic resources to protect the 
child’s life and health, the fostering of these two capability-based interests – emotions 
and affiliation – I refer to as the child’s ‘right to be parented’. 
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The Assumed Responsibility to Parent Incarcerated Children 
The articulation of the child’s ‘right to be parented’, with its conceptual basis derived 
from the (partial) citizenship status of children and its content founded in a 
capabilities approach, is crucial when it comes to examining the rights of children qua 
prisoner.  This is because the restriction on the child’s right to be parented that occurs 
as a result of imprisonment (the forced separation and prohibition of day-to-day 
contact necessarily prevents parents from meeting many of their child’s physical, 
emotional and affiliative needs) is beyond the legitimate restriction of citizenship 
rights that occurs when we are punished as citizens.  Limiting the child’s private right 
to be parented disrupts the reciprocity of the accountability relationship, creating an 
‘obligations gap’ where the duties owed to the child by the parent cannot be 
fulfilled.
149
 
How then can the reciprocity be restored?  One option would be to consider 
whether the protections afforded by Article 8 ECHR are sufficient to mitigate the 
impact on the ability of parents to fulfil their duties, for example by placing the child 
in secure accommodation close to her home and allowing frequent visits and phone 
calls.  However, even if the proportionality scales were heavily weighted in favour of 
the parent-child relationship, it is nonetheless a qualified right that can be restricted.  
Moreover, relying only on Article 8 fails to recognise adequately the child’s 
differential citizenship status: this is not simply about protecting an existing 
relationship from state interference (as it is for adult prisoners or for the child’s other 
relationships), it is about the differential source of the responsibility, a different type 
of right: duties are owed to children by their parents, whether these have been met in 
practice or not.  The obligations gap’ is not met by Article 8.   
Instead, I wish to argue that reciprocity is restored when the State assumes 
responsibility to parent incarcerated children; a responsibility owed to all incarcerated 
children regardless of the quality of parenting they have previously enjoyed.  To make 
this case we must return again to the inter-relationship between the political 
community and the child’s ‘private’ right to be parented.  It was noted above that 
where the limits of family freedom lie - the minimum standards required of parents - 
is properly a matter of public concern.  But within those boundaries there is 
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considerable freedom for parents to decide how to raise their children.  In some 
circumstances, for example in the use of physical chastisement or in relation to 
restricting another’s liberty, the State affords children less protection vis a vis their 
parents than is the case as between other citizens.  This exemplifies a wider point: that 
children’s exclusion from full participation within the polity, their lack of full 
citizenship rights, subjects them to decision-making that is potentially contrary to 
their interests as a group and which increases their vulnerability to the actions and 
decisions of others (potential physical harm, in relation to parental discipline for 
example).  This occurs in other ways too.  For example the limitation of social 
citizenship rights, including the right to work full-time, means that children are 
economically dependent on adults to feed, house, and clothe them, regardless of the 
child’s own capability to do so.  Thus, children’s status as partial citizen means that 
they are uniquely vulnerable to the actions and decisions of others in a way that adults 
are not.
150
   
Furthermore, because it is a dependency embedded in legal and political 
structures, it can be deemed to be state-sanctioned.  This has led Dixon and Nussbaum 
to argue that the state ‘should assume [my emphasis] responsibility for protecting 
children from the consequences of the special vulnerability it creates in relation to the 
decisions of others – by insuring them against the risk that their parents (or legal 
guardian) will turn out to be unable, or unwilling, to take reasonable steps to protect 
their [needs].’ 151   For Dixon and Nussbaum, this ‘insurance’, or assumed 
responsibility, approach justifies the prioritisation of children’s claim for 
welfare/socio-economic rights.  It can also be seen to underpin the power conferred 
on local authorities in England and Wales to assume parental responsibility and 
become the ‘corporate parent’ when parents fail in their duties to their child.152  I wish 
to make a similar argument: when children are incarcerated and parents are prevented 
from fulfilling fully their parental obligations, then the State must assume 
responsibility for doing so; children thus acquire a right to be parented which is 
enforceable against the State.  It is this additional responsibility that provides the 
necessary reciprocity to meet the obligations gap. 
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Currently, the extent to which the State ‘assumes parental responsibility’ for 
detained children in England and Wales is narrow.  First, although some elements of 
the ‘right to be parented’ are clearly met when children are incarcerated – basic 
physical needs such as food, health care, and shelter are provided for example
153
 - this 
does not signify the assumption of parental responsibility.  Instead, it is a duty owed 
to adult prisoners as well, who are equally prohibited by detention from meeting their 
own basic needs.
154
  A failure of the State to assume responsibility to do so instead 
would constitute degrading and inhuman behaviour, breaching the reciprocity owed to 
any incarcerated person.
155
  Secondly, an attempt last year to persuade the Court of 
Appeal that the State legally assumes parental responsibility for incarcerated children 
was rejected.  The argument was made in an unsuccessful judicial review brought by 
the Children’s Rights Alliance for England (CRAE), which sought to establish a duty 
owed by the Secretary of State for Justice to inform children who had been detained 
in STCs when the system of unlawful restraint was in place that they may be entitled 
to a tortious remedy.
156
  Lord Justice Laws held that:  
 
[the] State’s relationship with the trainees is not analogous to the 
parent/child  . . . the STC did not assume parental responsibility for the 
children.  Parental responsibility remained with their parents and, in the 
case of children who were the subject of a care order, with the designated 
local authority . . ..  
 
My argument is not that the State should necessarily assume legal parental 
responsibility for all incarcerated children;
157
 rather, it is that conceptually children 
have a right to be parented and that the State assumes responsibility for this right 
when it deprives a child of his liberty.  The State’s assumption of this responsibility 
need not give rise to specific legal remedy (as was argued in CRAE) but it should 
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require a political and economic commitment to restructure the juvenile secure estate.  
Specifically, this duty requires the use of care-based homes for all incarcerated 
children.  
 
The Case for Care-based Homes 
The primary purpose of identifying the child’s ‘right to be parented’ is to foreground 
the obligations owed by parents to their children: the element of children’s rights that 
fills the space between their partial citizenship and the full citizenship rights that 
adults enjoy; a type of right that cannot legitimately be restricted by imprisonment.  In 
determining the content of this right, I identified two of Nussbaum’s central 
capabilities as especially important in childhood – emotions and affiliation – and 
which require ‘supporting forms of human association’ (usually primarily from 
parents) and institutions that ‘constitute and nourish affiliation’ (usually primarily 
within families). Where parents are unable or unavailable to nurture the child’s 
affective/affiliative capabilities and the child is removed from the institution of the 
family, the State’s assumed responsibility requires the provision of alternatives.   
Specifically, I argue it requires the provision of caring relationships within a home.
158
   
I draw attention in particular to ‘home’ because as a concept it captures much 
more than the mere provision of accommodation or shelter. Lorna Fox has described 
‘home’ as ‘housing + x’, where the x factor encompasses intangible emotional, social, 
cultural, and psychological qualities such as security, reciprocity, identity, memories, 
privacy, and safety.
159
  These are qualities that facilitate the development of emotions 
and affiliation in children, and their articulation helps us to understand the close 
relationship between home, parenting
160
 and children’s development and wellbeing.161  
As a concept, ‘home’ has limited significance in English law.162  Nonetheless the 
presence of children has, in some private law disputes, transformed a ‘house’ into a 
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‘family home’ worthy of special legal protection.163  However, the legal recognition 
that home is central to children’s lives that emerges in these cases is absent when 
considering the nature and function of juvenile secure accommodation.   
There are crucial differences between the family home and a carceral home of 
course.  Being placed in detention is a temporary condition (hopefully) for most 
children, so the stability and memory association may be less than in other types of 
home. Further, Hallden has found that for children an important part of the ‘home’ is 
its role as a place of safety to return to when exploring the outside, or the strange.
164
  
For children in custody, the ‘home’ in which they are accommodated is paradoxically 
both the outside world and the inside; it cannot therefore provide a haven from the 
‘strange’.  Similarly, we may be cautious in advocating for ‘homes’ for detained 
children where the ‘home’ is a location of identity-development.165  It is perhaps not, 
therefore, always possible or desirable to detain children in accommodation that 
embodies the wider qualities of a ‘home’.  Should we therefore reject as irrelevant the 
concept of a ‘home’ for detained children?  I argue that we should not.  This is 
because it is inevitable that any place a child lives will shape him in some way in 
terms of his memories, his identity, his self-worth, and his self-esteem, regardless of 
its quality or nature; just as it is likely that a child will form attachments to anyone 
meeting his basic needs.
166
  This highlights the need to imbue these key concepts – 
parenting, care, and home - with positive normative values that can provide a basis for 
structuring the juvenile secure estate in a way that is consistent with the right of the 
child to be parented.   
Although it is impossible to ‘legislate for love’ or provide for incarcerated 
children the type of parenting and home that the best families provide, it is possible to 
develop structures and institutions that are most likely to provide ‘care’ and ‘home’ in 
the positive, normative sense described above.  To do so, the secure estate in England 
and Wales must abandon the institutions (YOIs) that foster relationships of control 
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and dominance,
167
 where children are fearful and anxious,
168
 and where the regimes 
‘destroy the potential to build positive attitudes towards and within social 
relationships’169 and instead use only secure children’s homes, where most children 
feel safe, have a sense of belonging, feel listened to, and which have the potential to 
feel like family, and like home.
170
  
 
The Future: plus ça change. . . ? 
 
The requirement for care-based homes necessitates a wide network of small homes 
across the country, catering for different needs, ages, and genders.  However, the 
likelihood of the secure estate being reformed in this way, even with fewer 
incarcerated children, is slim.  Instead, in 2013 the Government proposed reform by 
introducing a new type of custodial institution, the secure college.
171
  Motivated by a 
desire to cut spending and reduce re-offending, the specific proposals include the 
building of a ‘pathfinder’ college in the East Midlands – to open in 2017 – that will 
house up to 320 young people from the age of 12 upwards.  The colleges will be 
headed by a ‘principal’ and are purposefully large in order to be able to provide a 
range of educational and health facilities that are not possible (without great cost) in 
smaller units. The statutory basis for the colleges has been included in provisions in 
the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2013-14 but there is little detail there, or in the 
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consultation documents, about how they will operate.  The analysis presented here is 
therefore necessarily tentative.  
Three aspects of the proposals are generally problematic from a children’s 
rights perspective.  First, the Government has confirmed that boys and girls are to be 
accommodated together within the Colleges.
172
  Given that the majority of 
incarcerated children are boys, it is likely that the function and operation of the 
colleges (including training and educational provision, and health and mental health 
services) will be designed to cater for young men, and the specific needs of girls may 
not be adequately met. Furthermore, large mixed institutions may increase the risk 
that girls will be sexually exploited.
173
  The Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
called on the Government to carry out an equality impact assessment to consider the 
potential impact on girls of large, mixed institutions.
174
  Secondly, the proposed 
legislation includes a provision empowering staff to use ‘reasonable force’ in 
fulfilling their duties, including ensuring ‘good order and discipline’.  This is contrary 
to the decision in R (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Justice,
175
 and is 
likely to constitute a breach of Article 3 ECHR.
176
  Finally, the size of the colleges 
means there will be only a handful dispersed across the country, making the 
maintenance of existing family visits even harder since children are likely to be 
placed at great distances from home. 
In addition to these three specific rights-based issues, the colleges are unlikely 
to be able to provide the sort of care-based homes required by the above analysis. 
Secure Colleges, like YOIs, are to be large and penal in nature.
177
  Penal institutions 
that cater for a large number of children are unlikely to provide a context within 
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which the type of care-based relationships essential to nurture children’s emotional 
and affiliative capabilities can be maintained.  As Liebling and Crewe have noted in 
the context of adult prisons, penal institutions (and especially, it would seem, large 
ones
178
) now rely on performance targets and managerial controls to ensure 
compliance with minimal educational requirements or meaningful activity, or time 
outside the cell, or to comply with the limits on the use of restraint and so on. 
Although these help to ensure compliance with some of the minimum standards 
required by the UNCRC or the ECHR,
179
 they do not create an environment that 
fosters the building of relationships.  Instead ‘[r]elationships with prisoners risk 
becoming superficial, emotionally barren and defined by the absence of trust’.180  This 
is reflected in the proposed statutory duties of Secure College staff, which are 
primarily custodial (to prevent escape, prevent the commission of unlawful acts, to 
ensure good order and behaviour) and require only that they ‘attend [my emphasis] to 
[the] well-being’ of the children accommodated there.181   Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
there is no mention of ‘care’. 
When located within the framework set out in this article, it seems that Secure 
Colleges will be concerned with fulfilling the State’s obligations to the child as 
citizen.  Like the adult offender, the child is constructed as a conditional citizen who 
must be reformed in order to be integrated back in to the citizenry and the 
Government hopes that Secure Colleges will provide a better context than YOIs for 
this to be achieved.  This is an important element of the reciprocity that is owed to the 
child qua citizen, qua prisoner, to help her avoid future reoffending and to be 
integrated (back) into the citizenry.  But Secure Colleges only partially meet the 
reciprocity necessary in relation to incarcerated children.  The current proposals fail to 
recognise that the child’s status as demi citizen leaves a conceptual (and sometimes 
empirical) space that is filled by the child’s right to be parented, and that the parental 
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responsibility to fulfil that right is assumed by the state when the child is incarcerated. 
To meet that responsibility, the proposals for reform need to be re-focused to better 
set out how they will provide incarcerated children with caring relationships within 
accommodation that captures the ‘x factors’ of the ‘home’.  However, it is unlikely 
that this can be achieved within the current proposals; a fundamental rethink is 
therefore required.  
 
Concluding Comments 
 
Writing in the context of ‘special care’ in Finland, Pösö et al have argued that the use 
of closed institutions based on care, nurture, and education requires ‘a particular 
socio-cultural understanding of children, young people, problems and the role of 
public authorities, as well as of the interrelations between these’.182  They note that in 
Finland this understanding is evident from the ‘wide provision of social services to 
children and families with children which are universally available’. 183   Our 
preference for punitive, control-based models of punishment and imprisonment can in 
contrast be seen as a reflection of our own particular socio-cultural understanding of 
children, located within the pervasive neo-liberal model of responsibility and 
individual choice that regards children who commit the most serious offences as 
mature, responsible, and deserving of a penal regime that punishes rather than 
cares.
184
   
In this type of socio-cultural context the argument I have developed here – that 
the state has an assumed responsibility to parent incarcerated children – is subject to 
critique on the basis of ‘less eligibility’: an incarcerated child should not receive an 
advantage from her (chosen) criminal offending – a ‘right to be parented’ and placed 
in a care-based home – when other ‘non-blameworthy’ children may be living in 
worse homes with very poor or no parenting.  However, this criticism can be met in 
two ways.  The first is simply to refute a neo-liberal approach to punishment and to 
argue that children – even more so that adults – do not ‘choose’ to offend but are 
limited by circumstance and deserve support and not (just) punishment.  Secondly, 
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and less controversially, the right for incarcerated minors is one that children outside 
of the secure estate also should and do have.  The law of England and Wales requires 
certain standards of parenting
185
 and where these are not met then the State will 
intervene.
186
   Sometimes this requires taking children away from their parents and, 
when it does, they are placed with foster parents or in care-based children’s homes.  
Although local authorities may not in practice always fulfil their statutory duties to 
children in need, this is not a reason to entrench harsher conditions for children 
deprived of their liberty.  The right for incarcerated children that I am arguing for – 
the right to be parented, underpinning the right to be placed in a care-based home 
when sentenced to custody - therefore mirrors that owed to children outside of the 
secure estate.  If it does go further (for example, in terms of the normative aspects of 
parenting based on the capabilities approach) then this is an argument for extending 
the protection (re good parenting) that children outside the secure estate receive.  In 
any event, it is not unusual for greater obligations to be placed on the State when it 
acts as parent than we place on actual parents.
187
  This is not about providing an 
advantage to children in state care over those children living with their families; 
rather, it reflects the value we place on parental freedom to decide how to raise their 
children and also recognises that State actors require greater regulation than parents 
because (in general) they are less likely to act within the bonds of love.
188
   
The purpose of this article is not, therefore, to argue for extra rights for 
detained children, but to provide a conceptual framework to show why an existing 
(but so far unarticulated) type of children’s right – a child’s right to be parented – 
continues to be owed to the child when he is detained, why this right is assumed by 
the state, and why it should be used to shape the juvenile secure estate.  Specifically, 
the assumed responsibility to parent incarcerated children gives rise to a further right: 
the right to be placed in a care-based home and not a penal institution.  By 
conceptualising the rights of incarcerated children through a citizenship lens, an 
argument could be made that all incarcerated minors, regardless of vulnerability and 
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regardless of age, have a right to be placed in a care-based home because only there 
can the state fulfil its assumed responsibility to parent.   
 
